NEW YORK, March 22, 2023 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) -- Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C., a nationally recognized shareholder rights law firm, reminds investors that class actions have been commenced on behalf of stockholders of Inspirato Incorporated (NASDAQ: ISPO), Kornit Digital Ltd. (NASDAQ: KRNT), and Alico, Inc. (NASDAQ: ALCO), and Catalent, Inc. (NYSE: CTLT). Stockholders have until the deadlines below to petition the court to serve as lead plaintiff. Additional information about each case can be found at the link provided.

Inspirato Incorporated (NASDAQ: ISPO)

Class Period: May 11, 2022 - December 15, 2022

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: April 17, 2023

According to the Complaint, the Company made false and misleading statements to the market. Inspirato’s financial statements for the quarters ending March 31, 2022 and June 30, 2022 (collectively, the “Non-Reliance Periods”) could not be relied upon. The Company incorrectly applied Accounting Standards Update (ASU) No. 2016-02, Leases (Topic 842) (“ASC 842”), resulting in the unreliability of the Non-Reliance Periods. Based on these facts, the Company’s public statements were false and materially misleading throughout the class period. When the market learned the truth about Inspirato, investors suffered damages.

For more information on the Inspirato class action go to: https://bespc.com/cases/ISPO

Kornit Digital Ltd. (NASDAQ: KRNT)

Class Period: February 17, 2021 - July 5, 2022

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: April 17, 2023

Kornit designs and manufactures industrial digital printing technologies for the garment, apparel, and textile industries. The Company’s digital inkjet printers enable end-users to print both direct-to-garment (“DTG”) and direct-to-fabric (“DTF”). In DTG printing, designs and images are printed directly onto finished textiles such as clothing and apparel. In DTF printing, large rolls of fabric pass through wide inkjet printers that print images and designs directly onto swaths of fabric that are then cut and sewn into a product, and can be used in the fashion and home décor industries. Kornit also produces and sells textile inks and other consumables for use in its digital printers. Through customer support contracts, Kornit also provides customer assistance and equipment services for its printers, including technical support, maintenance, and repair.

During the Class Period, the Company also began offering software services to its customers, including a suite of end-to-end fulfillment and production solutions, called KornitX, through which the Company provides, among other things, automated production systems and workflow and inventory management.

The Company’s largest customer is multinational e-commerce company, Amazon.com, Inc. (“Amazon”). Among the largest of Kornit’s other customers during the Class Period were Delta Apparel, Inc. (“Delta Apparel”), a leading provider of activewear and lifestyle apparel products, and Fanatics, Inc. (“Fanatics”), a global digital sports platform and leading provider of licensed sports merchandise. Kornit generates more than 60% of its revenues from its ten largest customers. Accordingly, it was critically important for Kornit to maintain those major customers as well as continue to grow its customer base in order to achieve the Company’s ambitious goal of “becoming a $1 billion revenue company in 2026.”

Throughout the Class Period, Kornit repeatedly touted the purported competitive advantages provided by its technology and assured investors that it faced virtually no meaningful competition in the “direct-to-garment” printing market. The Company also represented that there was strong demand for its digital printing systems, consumable products, such as textile inks, as well as the services Kornit provided customers to maintain and manage its digital printers, and to manage customer workflow. Kornit further assured investors that the purportedly strong demand for the Company’s products and services would enable it to maintain its existing customer base and attract new customers that would limit the risks associated with a substantial portion of its revenues being concentrated among a small number of large customers.

These and similar statements made throughout the Class Period were false. In truth, Kornit and its senior executives knew, or at a minimum, recklessly disregarded, that the Company’s digital printing business was plagued by severe quality control problems and customer service deficiencies. Those problems and deficiencies caused Kornit to cede market share to competitors, which, in turn, led to a decrease in the Company’s revenue as customers went elsewhere for their digital printing needs. As a result of these misrepresentations, Kornit ordinary shares traded at artificially inflated prices throughout the Class Period.

Investors began to learn the truth on March 28, 2022, when Delta Apparel and Fanatics—two of Kornit’s major customers—announced that for months they had collaborated with one of Kornit’s principal competitors to develop a new digital printing technology that directly competed with products and services Kornit offered. Delta Apparel revealed that it had already installed this new technology in four of its existing digital print facilities and had plans to expand further. The utilization of this new, competing technology by Delta Apparel and Fanatics reflected the widespread dissatisfaction of Kornit’s major customers with the Company’s product quality and customer service, and meant that Kornit would likely lose revenue from two of its most important customers.

On May 11, 2022, despite reporting revenues that exceeded expectations, Kornit reported a net loss of $5.2 million for the first quarter of 2022, compared to a profit of $5.1 million in the prior year period. The Company also issued revenue guidance for the second quarter of 2022 that was significantly below analysts’ expectations. Kornit attributed its disappointing guidance to a slowdown in orders from the Company’s customers in the e-commerce segment. In addition, the Company admitted that, for at least the previous two quarters, Kornit knew that one of its largest customers, Delta Apparel, had acquired digital printing systems from a Kornit competitor. As a result of these disclosures, the price of Kornit ordinary shares declined by $18.78 per share, or 33.3%.

Then, on July 5, 2022, after the market closed, Kornit disclosed that it would report a sizeable shortfall in revenue for the second quarter of 2022. Specifically, Kornit expected revenue for the second quarter to be in the range of $56.4 million to $59.4 million, far short of the previous revenue guidance of between $85 million and $95 million that the Company provided less than two months earlier, in May 2022. Kornit attributed the substantial revenue miss to “a significantly slower pace of direct-to-garment (DTG) systems orders in the second quarter as compared to our prior expectations.” As a result of these disclosures, the price of Kornit ordinary shares declined by an additional $8.10 per share, or 25.7%.

As a result of Defendants’ wrongful acts and omissions, and the precipitous decline in the market value of the Company’s shares, Plaintiff and other Class members have suffered significant losses and damages.

For more information on the Kornit class action go to: https://bespc.com/cases/KRNT

Alico, Inc. (NASDAQ: ALCO)

Class Period: February 4, 2021 - December 13, 2022

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: April 18, 2023

Alico, together with its subsidiaries, operates as an agribusiness and land management company in the U.S. The Company operates in two segments: (i) Alico Citrus; and (ii) Land Management and Other Operations. The Alico Citrus segment cultivates citrus trees to produce citrus for delivery to the processed and fresh citrus markets. The Land Management and Other Operations segment owns and manages land in Collier, Glades, and Hendry Counties, and also leases land for recreational and grazing purposes, conservation, and mining activities.

Throughout the Class Period, Defendants made materially false and misleading statements regarding the Company’s business, operations, and compliance policies. Specifically, Defendants made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (i) Alico had deficient disclosure controls and procedures and internal control over financial reporting; (ii) as a result, the Company had improperly calculated Alico’s deferred tax liabilities over a multi-year period; (iii) accordingly, the Company would likely be required to restate one or more of its previously issued financial statements; (iv) the foregoing would impede the timely completion of the audit of the Company’s financial results in advance of its year-end earnings call; and (v) as a result, the Company’s public statements were materially false and misleading at all relevant times.

On December 6, 2022, Alico issued a press release announcing that the Company was postponing its year-end earnings call. Specifically, the press release stated that “additional time is required for completion of the audit of its financial results for the period ended September 30, 2022 by its independent registered public accounting firm.”

On this news, Alico’s stock price fell $3.06 per share, or 10.42%, to close at $26.29 per share on December 6, 2022.

Then, on December 7, 2022, Alico issued a press release providing a further update on the delays that the Company faced in reporting fiscal year 2022 results and making the required associated filings with the SEC. In the press release, the Company disclosed that “[t]he key item that is requiring such additional time involves evaluation of the proper amount of the Company’s Deferred Tax Liability, particularly certain portions of that Deferred Tax Liability arising in prior fiscal years, including those going back to fiscal year 2019 or possibly several years before fiscal year 2019.”

Finally, on December 13, 2022, Alico filed with the SEC its Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended September 30, 2022 (the “2022 10-K”). In the 2022 10-K, Alico “restate[d] the Company’s previously issued audited consolidated balance sheet, audited consolidated statements of changes in equity and related disclosures as of September 30, 2021 included in the Company’s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended September 30, 2021 (the ‘2021 10-K’) previously filed with the SEC and the Company’s previously issued unaudited consolidated balance sheet, unaudited consolidated statements of changes in equity and related disclosures as of the end of each quarterly periods ended June 30, 2022, March 31, 2022, December 31, 2021, June 30, 2021, March 31, 2021 and December 31, 2020 included in the Company’s respective Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for each of the quarters then ended previously filed with the SEC (together with the 2021 10-K, the ‘Financial Statements’).” The Company also disclosed that “[o]n December 12, 2022, the audit committee (the ‘Audit Committee’) of the board of directors of the Company concluded that the Company’s previously issued Financial Statements can no longer be relied upon due to an error identified during the completion of the 2022 10-K.” Specifically, Alico stated that “[t]he error that led to the Audit Committee’s conclusion relates to the calculation of the deferred tax liabilities for the fiscal years 2015 through 2019, which resulted in a cumulative reduction in the Company’s deferred tax liability, and a corresponding cumulative increase in retained earnings, of approximately $2,512,000 on the Company’s balance sheet as of September 30, 2022.”

On this news, Alico’s stock price fell $2.64 per share, or 9.53%, to close at $25.05 per share on December 14, 2022.

As a result of Defendants’ wrongful acts and omissions, and the precipitous decline in the market value of the Company’s securities, Plaintiff and other Class members have suffered significant losses and damages.

For more information on the Alico class action go to: https://bespc.com/cases/ALCO

Catalent, Inc. (NYSE: CTLT)

Class Period: August 30, 2021 - October 31, 2022

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: April 25, 2023

This case is about the rise and fall of a company that initially benefited from the COVID-19 pandemic (also referred to herein as “COVID-19,” “COVID,” or the “pandemic”). As a vaccine manufacturer, Catalent was one of the beneficiaries of COVID because it seemed well positioned to capitalize on the rapidly growing demand for vaccine production capacity. Indeed, Catalent almost doubled its business during the first year of the pandemic when the bulk of vaccines were administered. Catalent’s success during the early stages of the pandemic caused its stock price to soar to record highs. By mid-2021, when COVID-related work dropped off, Defendants engaged in accounting and channel stuffing schemes to pad the Company’s revenues. These schemes gave Catalent the appearance of continued growth, causing its stock price to reach new record highs. Meanwhile, to support these schemes and keep pace with its lofty growth targets, Catalent was cutting corners on safety and control procedures at key production facilities. By late 2022, Catalent reported significant sales declines and excess inventory throughout its supply chain. As a result, Catalent stock dropped to pre-COVID levels causing substantial losses to its investors as they learned that Catalent’s early-COVID revenues were never sustainable, and its Class Period revenues were the product of securities fraud.

By way of background, Catalent is a multinational corporation that manufactures and packages drugs into delivery devices fit for human consumption (i.e., pre-filled syringes, vials, pills, etc.) pursuant to long-term supply contracts with pharmaceutical companies. Catalent directly sells these products to pharmaceutical companies which later sell them through the supply chain to healthcare providers (i.e., hospitals, clinics, etc.), which administer them to patients, who are the end consumers. 

Prior to the onset of the pandemic, Catalent’s quarterly revenue averaged approximately $669 million between April 2018 and March 2020. During the period that those revenues were reported to the market, Catalent stock had an average closing price of approximately $47.57 per share. In early 2020, Catalent took on numerous large-scale COVID projects, including filling vaccines into syringes for Moderna and AstraZeneca. Those projects catapulted the Company’s quarterly revenues to record highs, which averaged approximately $940 million between April 2020 and March 2021, a 40 percent jump over preCOVID revenues. Over the period when that revenue surge was reported to the market, Catalent stock had an average closing price of $102.42 per share.

By mid-2021, as the pandemic wore on, demand for Catalent’s COVID products decreased because vaccinations had already been administered to a large number of potential patients. For example, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) data indicates that COVID vaccinations in the United States reached an all-time high of 4.5 million doses on April 1, 2021, and averaged 1.5 million daily doses between December 14, 2020 and August 28, 2021. By comparison, CDC data indicates that average daily vaccinations in the United States were under 625,000 during the Class Period.

Despite this marked decline in the demand for COVID vaccines, Catalent continued to report growing revenues and assured investors that customer demand remained strong during the Class Period. The average quarterly revenue reported during the Class Period was $1.2 billion, an 80 percent increase over preCOVID-19 revenues and a 28 percent increase over its reported revenues for the first year of the pandemic. Unbeknownst to investors, Defendants artificially inflated these revenues through fraudulent accounting and channel stuffing schemes to mislead investors into believing that Catalent was generating sustainable revenue growth. Defendants’ fraud caused Catalent stock to trade at a record high of $142.64 per share on September 9, 2021 and an average closing price of approximately $108.00 per share during the Class Period.

Statements made by Defendants throughout the Class Period were materially false and misleading when made because they misrepresented or failed to disclose the following adverse facts, which were known to Defendants or recklessly disregarded by them:

a. Catalent materially overstated its revenue and earnings by prematurely recognizing revenue in violation of U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”);

b. Catalent had material weaknesses in its internal control over financial reporting related to revenue recognition;

c. Catalent falsely represented demand for its products while it knowingly sold more product to its direct customers than could be sold to healthcare providers and end consumers;

d. Catalent disregarded regulatory rules at key production facilities in order to rapidly produce excess inventory that was used to pad the Company’s financial results through premature revenue recognition in violation of GAAP and/or stuffing its direct customers with this excess inventory; and

e. As a result of the foregoing, Defendants lacked a reasonable basis for their positive statements about the Company’s financial performance, outlook, and regulatory compliance during the Class Period.

Catalent’s misrepresentations were first revealed to the market on August 29, 2022, when the Company disclosed that demand for its COVID-related products was facing substantial headwinds. On this news, Catalent’s stock price declined by 7.4 percent to close at $92.28 per share on August 29, 2022.

Then, on September 20, 2022, a Washington Post report exposed that the release of COVID-19 vaccines produced by Catalent had been delayed by regulators because of improper sterilization at one of Catalent’s key facilities. On this news, Catalent’s stock price declined by 9.3 percent over two trading sessions, to close at $79.06 per share on September 22, 2022.

On November 1, 2022, Catalent revealed that its quarterly earnings had declined to zero and lowered its financial guidance, indicating falling demand. The Company also disclosed that regulatory issues at its key facilities were negatively impacting its financial results. On this news, Catalent’s stock price declined by 31.7 percent over two trading sessions, to close at $44.90 per share on November 2, 2022. All told, over the course of the Class period, Catalent stock fell from a high above $142.00 to close at $44.90 on November 2, 2022, a more than 68 percent decline.

On November 16, 2022, Catalent revealed that it was carrying approximately $400 million in excess inventory, further revealing that the Company had misrepresented demand for its products as well as its purported ability to predict future demand. On this news, Catalent’s stock price declined by 8.5 percent, over two trading sessions, to close at $42.07 per share on November 17, 2022.

Then, on December 8, 2022, GlassHouse Research published a report claiming that Catalent had been materially overstating its revenues by $568.2 million in violation of GAAP. The report detailed numerous red flags that were indicative of Catalent’s improper accounting practices. These red flags included the rapid increase in Catalent’s contract asset and inventory balances, declining customer deposits, executive turnover, and recent scrutiny of the Company’s revenue accounting by regulators. The report also described how Catalent’s direct customers were stuffed with excess inventory which “will take years to unwind.” On this news, Catalent’s stock price declined 3.6 percent to close at $45.54 per share on December 8, 2022.

As a result of Defendants’ wrongful acts and omissions, and the precipitous decline in the market value of Catalent securities, Plaintiff and other Class members have suffered significant losses and damages.

For more information on the Catalent class action go to: https://bespc.com/cases/CTLT

About Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C.:

Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C. is a nationally recognized law firm with offices in New York, California, and South Carolina. The firm represents individual and institutional investors in commercial, securities, derivative, and other complex litigation in state and federal courts across the country. For more information about the firm, please visit www.bespc.com. Attorney advertising. Prior results do not guarantee similar outcomes.

Contact Information:

Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C.
Brandon Walker, Esq.
Marion Passmore, Esq.
(212) 355-4648
investigations@bespc.com
www.bespc.com